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A Parting of the Ways?  
U.S. Economic Security and  
Trilateralism in the Asia-Pacific
ABStRAct
Diverging economic security interests are complicating economic 
and political relations between Australia, China, and the United 
States, threatening the extensive economic interdependence that 
has developed over the past three decades. Concerns deriving 
from China’s ‘rise’ have the potential to generate a more politicized 
regional economic environment with significant implications for 
efforts by political authorities in Australia, China, and the United 
States to pursue economic security and for their relationships with 
each other.
J.D. Kenneth Boutin
Alfred Deakin Research Institute
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Introduction
Economic and political relations between the states that are the subject of this study are 
complex. This is due in no small part to the importance attached to economic security 
in Australia, China, and the United States. While there are particular common interests, 
political authorities in these states pursue distinct economic security agendas with 
conflicting requirements that entail significant implications for the compatibility of their 
foreign economic policies. The politico-military and economic ‘rise’ of China is bringing 
contrasting economic security interests in the Asia-Pacific region into sharp focus. 
Concern over China’s objectives and the resulting transformation of the regional politico-
military and economic landscape is encouraging heightened attention to the economic 
requirements of national security on the part of authorities in the United States, though the 
Sino-American relationship cannot be reduced to one of mere strategic competition. This 
study considers the prospects for trilateralism, focusing on the environment for economic 
relations between Australia, China, and the United States. It examines the foundations 
of economic security in the United States and Australia, the economic security impact of 
China’s rise, and the implications of changing U.S. economic security policy. Efforts by 
U.S. authorities to promote their multi-faceted economic security requirements in light of 
the perceived challenge from China potentially threaten the common ground of economic 
interdependence in the Asia-Pacific and thus the basis for trilateralism. 
An important caveat is in order. The U.S. policy environment is complex where China 
is concerned. Various institutional actors with dissimilar and potentially conflicting 
perspectives and interests contribute to the ‘China policy’ of the United States. Space 
limitations preclude detailed discussion of relevant policy dynamics, however, or even 
the survey of recent economic security-related initiatives by the United States. This study 
focuses instead on key policy trends and developments and their impact and implications.
Economic Security considered
Before examining the foundations of economic security in the United States and Australia, 
it is necessary to address a number of conceptual issues. Economic security is no less 
amorphous and contested a concept than security itself. There is no commonly-accepted 
definition of economic security, despite the increasing currency of the term in scholarly 
and policy circles alike. Alternative understandings of economic security continue to co-
exist despite the general conceptual and policy trends outlined below.
Consideration of economic security is best established in the context of national security. 
This state-centric approach, which is referred to here as ‘national economic security,’ 
is relatively narrow in focus and effectively realist in perspective, as suggested by 
terminology such as ‘economic defence’ and ‘economic warfare’ and the propensity 
toexamine economic issues in an adversarial inter-state context.1 There is a distinct 
temporal dimension as well, with a characteristic focus on issues of pressing policy 
concern. 
This approach to economic security encourages a focus on the material basis of national 
security, particularly in respect to the resources required by defence establishments, and 
trends and developments which impact in these terms. Economic statecraft through the 
use of economic instruments to attain security objectives that if economic in nature, are 
significant through their national security implications also constitutes an important feature 
of national economic security policy. 
Formal consideration of economic security issues in an alternative context emerged 
relatively recently. Official attention to economic issues in this context was encouraged by 
the policy space opened up by the end of the Cold War. The importance attached to what 
1  Emily O. Goldman and Leo J. Blanken, ‘The Economic Foundations of Military Power,’ in Peter 
Dombrowski, ed. Guns and Butter: The Political Economy of International Security (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p.37.
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is referred to here as ‘comprehensive economic security’ continues to grow, facilitated by 
factors such as rising popular expectations and the apparent success of policy initiatives 
focusing on socio-economic progress in a number of Asia-Pacific states.2 
Comprehensive economic security is more complex than national economic security. 
As its title suggests, the scope of comprehensive economic security is much broader. It 
encompasses a diverse set of issues, ranging from economic growth and competitiveness 
to distributive equity and the socio-economic impact of economic trends and 
developments. This breadth is closely related to another key feature of comprehensive 
economic security: no longer is the state the sole or even a necessary referent of security. 
Comprehensive economic security is defined by a switch from a focus on the economic 
welfare of states to the welfare of groups within states. Comprehensive economic security 
may focus on human, societal, or regime security, or some combination of these. This 
can be accompanied by concern over social cohesion and stability, particularly where the 
objective is regime security. 
Comprehensive economic security is noteworthy in another important respect. 
Concern over the issues involved encourages a longer-term perspective than typically 
is associated with national economic security, such as on the basis of economic 
progress. This is manifest in attention to the arrangements and processes underlying 
sustainable development alongside issues of more immediate concern. This in turn 
encourages a more positive perspective toward inter-state economic collaboration, where 
common economic objectives provide considerable potential for mutually-beneficial 
interdependence.3
Though the stakes involved in comprehensive economic security may appear less critical 
than those of national economic security, where states may face existential threats, it 
involves objectives that are no less daunting. These constitute something of a moving 
target in that they tend to be far more ambiguous and unpredictable as a result of the 
domestic and international contexts in which they are pursued. Popular expectations tend 
to increase in tandem with the success of political authorities in raising living standards, 
for example, while the adoption of market-oriented policies forces political authorities to 
balance the potential benefits against the risks of increasing vulnerability to exogenous 
economic trends and developments over which they have little or no control. Beverly 
Crawford terms this the ‘economic security dilemma’.4
How political authorities approach economic security rarely is straightforward, particularly 
where they pursue conflicting national and comprehensive economic security objectives. 
Crucial differences in underlying premises and core concerns mean that political 
authorities are confronted by challenging policy requirements which potentially encourage 
counter-productive policy responses. Economic collaboration potentially contributes 
to defence-industrial as well as economic development in states that may constitute 
or emerge as politico-military rivals, for example. This can force political authorities to 
carefully consider their policy options and ensures that there are no definitive economic 
security policy imperatives.  
Economic Security in the United States
The economic security policy of the United States continues to evolve, with increasing 
efforts to promote national and comprehensive economic security concurrently. As well 
2  Miles Kahler, ‘Economic Security in an Era of Globalization,’ in Helen E.S. Nesadurai, ed. 
Globalization and Economic Security in East Asia: Governance and Institutions (London: 
Routledge, 2009), p.25.  
3  See Helen E.S. Nesadurai, ‘Conceptualising Economic Security in an Era of Globalisation: 
What Does the East Asian Experience Reveal?’ in Helen E.S. Nesadurai, ed. Globalisation and 
Economic Security in East Asia: Governance and Institutions (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.4-
12, for a comprehensive discussion of the key features of comprehensive economic security.   
4  Beverly Crawford, ‘The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence.’ 
Millennium Vol.23, No.1 (1994), p.26.
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as generally complicating its foreign economic policy, this has major implications for the 
response of the United States to the rise of China.
U.S. authorities traditionally approached economic issues in national security terms. 
Considerable importance was attached to the development of autonomous industrial 
capabilities from an early point in the history of the United States. This focus was 
maintained through the Cold War, with defence-driven protectionism a prominent feature 
of U.S. policy. As one official study noted, ‘the maintenance and protection of a broad U.S. 
technological base is vital to national security’.5 Economic measures often constituted 
an important pillar of national security initiatives. These were integral to efforts by the 
United States to structure the post-war Asia-Pacific security environment through the ‘San 
Francisco system’ of states for example.6 
The importance attached to national economic security in the United States did not abate 
with the end of the Cold War, with China supplanting the Soviet Union as the focus of 
suspicion in conservative circles. The importance of national economic security has been 
reinforced by post-9/11 concern over ‘homeland security,’ in which the technological 
capabilities of the United States are regarded as providing an important advantage in 
defeating the terrorist threat.7 Post-Cold War U.S. economic security policy devotes 
considerable attention to the capacity of the defence-industrial base to serve the defence 
establishment and to its integrity in the face of globalizing pressures threatening national 
autonomy in crucial industrial sectors. This can be seen in the continuing importance of 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which considers 
the national security implications of foreign acquisitions of and investment in American 
firms, particularly those active in the defence sector. Moreover, there is strong interest 
in adapting the CFIUS process to changing economic conditions.8 Extensive reliance 
on instruments of economic statecraft similarly remains a feature of U.S. foreign policy 
despite the established ideological preference for market-based policy approaches.
The United States was a relatively late convert to conceptualizing economic security in 
comprehensive terms. This fact notwithstanding, recognition of the importance of the 
objectives involved is well established in the United States. Relevant U.S. policy efforts 
have been directed primarily at the structural level, rather than towards the development 
of institutions, though this has occurred as well. This is manifest in the central role of the 
United States in developing, sustaining, and deepening the Bretton Woods-based liberal 
international economic order, even if its approach to economic regionalism has been 
likened to ‘competitive liberalisation’.9 Such an approach was facilitated by the capacity 
of the private sector in the United States to drive economic progress and prosperity. 
This effectively relieved U.S. authorities of the need to address the requirements of 
comprehensive economic security other than through helping to provide international 
and domestic environments and collective goods conducive to the success of American 
industry. 
Comprehensive economic security has generated sustained policy attention in the 
United States since the late 1980s. As well as benefitting from the post-Cold War political 
environment, this is a product of concern over what is perceived as an eroding position 
5  United States, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness in 
High Technology Industries (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p.4.
6  Kent Calder, ‘Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative 
Perspective.’ The Pacific Review Vol.17, No.1 (2004), pp.139-42.
7  Jeffrey Lewis, ‘The Role of Technology in Protecting America’s Gathering Places,’ in James 
J.F. Forest, ed. Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (Volume II: Public Spaces and 
Social Institutions) (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), p.222.
8  Jacques S. Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), p.70.
9  Thomas G. Moore, ‘The United States and Regional Governance in East Asia: The Changing 
Face of American Power,’ in Nicholas Thomas, ed. Governance and Regionalism in Asia 
(London: Routledge, 2009), p.207.
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relative to major economic competitors such as China and India.10 Recognition of popular 
welfare as a security issue was reflected in President Jimmy Carter’s ‘Economic Security 
Council’ initiative and was cited by President George W. Bush as an important reason for 
encouraging domestic technological innovation.11 The acrimonious nature of economic 
policy debate within the United States at the present time testifies to the depth of concern 
over the issues involved.
The continuing importance of national economic security in the United States complicates 
the policy agenda by forcing authorities to promote national and comprehensive economic 
security objectives simultaneously, and to attempt to harmonize these wherever possible. 
The experience of the United States demonstrates the difficulties inherent in reconciling 
national and comprehensive economic security. Considerable tension is apparent in U.S. 
policy, with authorities often forced to choose between disparate policy objectives, and 
supporting the liberal international economic order in the interest of economic prosperity 
while resorting to illiberal measures such as sanctions in the interest of national security. 
The continuing importance of both facets of economic security and the strength of 
concerned domestic constituencies ensure that U.S. authorities will continue to face a 
significant policy dilemma where economic security is concerned. 
The central position of national economic security in the U.S. policy agenda and the 
manner in which it is pursued have important international repercussions. U.S. authorities 
are more inclined than their counterparts elsewhere to consider economic issues 
through the lenses of national security. Not only is it the case that the U.S. government 
devotes considerable attention to the requirements of national security though its foreign 
economic policy, but national economic security considerations cast a large shadow 
over its economic relations in general. Economic ties with other states have proven very 
sensitive to the state of U.S. national security, with the U.S. government demonstrating 
its willingness to subordinate comprehensive economic security objectives to those of 
national economic security where these conflict. The United States has on a number 
of occasions sought to reorient economic mechanisms such as Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) to address national security issues, for example.12 The characteristic 
U.S. economic statecraft approach adds to the difficulty of insulating the pursuit of 
comprehensive economic security from national security concerns. 
The limited scope for U.S. authorities to pursue comprehensive economic security 
in isolation from national economic security has little direct impact on relations with 
Australia, with which the United States shares a close security relationship, but is a 
crucial factor in the context of Sino-American economic relations. China’s dual character 
as a major economic partner in terms of trade and investment, and as a politico-military 
rival – at least in some quarters – ensures that its rise figures prominently in U.S. policy 
considerations. Sino-American economic interdependence is well established and 
continues to deepen, but is vulnerable to U.S. national security concerns. Concerns over 
China are compounded by the threat to the synergies underlying their complementary 
economic positions resulting from the declining compatibility of their high-technology 
industries in sectors such as aerospace, information technology, and biotechnology. 
China’s developmental trajectory suggests that the industrial gap with the United States 
will continue to diminish, resulting in increasing competition between U.S. and Chinese 
firms. 
Australian Economic Security
Economic security in Australia is straightforward compared to that of the United States. 
10  See Dan Steinbock, ‘New Innovation Challengers: The Rise of China and India.’ The National 
Interest No.87 (2007), pp.67-69.
11  United States, Office of the White House, A New Generation of American Innovation 
(Washington: Office of the White House, 2004), pp.11-12.
12  J.D. Kenneth Boutin, ‘Balancing Act: Competition and Cooperation in US Asia-Pacific 
Regionalism.’ Japanese Journal of Political Science Vol.12, No.2 (2011), p.186.
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Australian economic security is quite distinct in that it is only indirectly bound up with 
national security concerns. The comprehensive economic security focus of Australian 
authorities is driven by the perceived requirements of economic growth and prosperity.13 
The export-oriented nature of the Australian economy resulting from a relatively small 
population means that Australia’s economic security concerns largely correspond to the 
‘market access security’ category of Christopher Dent.14 This is manifest in the persistent 
attention devoted to developing trade relations with key export markets such as China 
and India.
This has made it possible for Australian authorities to pursue highly-divergent national 
and economic security policies. In both cases these involve asymmetric relationships. 
Australia maintains a close security relationship with the United States while avidly 
engaging China in economic terms, without any apparent conflict.15 Australia has 
displayed far greater determination to engage multilateral economic frameworks in 
the region than the United States, and has done so over an extended period, without 
regarding this as jeopardizing its national security. Where national security and economic 
security do overlap in Australia is in terms of the importance of regional stability to 
economic prosperity. This encourages strong support for the Asia-Pacific security role of 
the United States, which is considered crucial to regional stability.16  
While there is no appreciable policy dilemma facing Australian authorities where 
economic security is concerned, Australian requirements do have notable implications for 
trilateralism. These render Australia vulnerable to developments in both China and the 
United States, whether these occur by design or otherwise. Australia’s economic security 
interests are best served by stable and amicable Sino-American relations, and it is critical 
that Australia be able to adapt to changes in the Sino-American relationship. Australia’s 
capacity to do so is complicated by its relatively marginal position within the trilateral 
relationship, which limits its capacity to develop and pursue policy initiatives.
china’s Economic and Politico-Military Rise
China’s rise is having a mixed impact within the Asia-Pacific region. Its economic rise 
provides opportunities for particular industrial sectors in some states while curtailing 
them in other cases, while its politico-military rise is generating greater concern in some 
states than others, thereby encouraging a range of policy responses across the region. 
Some key features and the implications of China’s economic and politico-military rise are 
explored in this section.  
The economic and politico-military facets of China’s rise are closely related. Its economic 
development provides the means for an ambitious defence modernization program 
and contributes to China’s regional political influence, while growing Chinese political 
influence increases the prospects for securing its economic objectives in both bilateral 
and multilateral contexts. The extent as well as the pace of China’s rise reinforce diverse 
economic security concerns in the United States and elsewhere in the region. 
China’s economic rise since its hesitant and limited opening to the global economy in the 
late 1970s has been nothing short of impressive. China’s profile in terms of production, 
research and development (R&D), resources, finance (including outward foreign direct 
13  See Hadi Soesastro, ‘Economic Development: The Security Impact,’ in Bunn Nagara and K.S. 
Balakrishnan, eds. The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific (Kuala Lumpur: 
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p.59.
14  Christopher M. Dent, ‘Economic Security,’ in Alan Collins, ed. Contemporary Security Studies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.212.
15  See Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 
pp.124-25.
16  See ‘Asia’s New Distribution of Power and its Implications’ by Minister for Defence Stephen 
Smith at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, 4 
June 2011 (<http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/06/04/asias-new-distribution-of-power-
and-its-implications>).
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investment), and services has been transformed over the course of three decades to the 
point where China constitutes a key economic pillar regionally and globally. There is every 
prospect that this trend will continue and that its regional and global economic importance 
will continue to increase.  
China’s economic rise cannot be considered in isolation from the structural transformation 
produced by economic globalization, particularly in the context of the Asia-Pacific 
region. There has been a progressive deepening of regional economic interdependence 
encompassing many aspects of commercial activity. This is manifest in regional trans-
national industrial integration trends. Industrial integration first developed in terms of 
production in the 1960s, and in recent years this has broadened and deepened in concert 
with the changing demands of export competitiveness and the expanding ranks of Asia-
Pacific export-oriented economies. Chinese high-technology industry successfully built on 
the opportunities provided by this trend to emerge as a source of technological innovation, 
and China increasingly features as a destination for foreign investment in R&D, with firms 
attracted by the advantages of working with local firms as well as by the incentives offered 
by Chinese authorities.17 
Regional economic interdependence is as much a political as an economic phenomenon 
in that the domestic and international political space provided by governments has been 
crucial.18 The scope for mutually-beneficial economic collaboration and the perceived 
benefits in terms of comprehensive economic security have been crucial to political 
acceptance and support for the processes involved. In many states interdependence 
is regarded as providing a strong basis for economic progress through contributing to 
the development of internationally-competitive industries. Regional industrial integration 
reflected the complementary strengths of firms based in different states and minimized 
the potential competitive pressures of regional industrial overcapacity, impeding the 
development of deep-rooted economic rivalries.19  
Economic interdependence entails complex security implications. The risks and the 
benefits tend to be distributed unequally between states.20 Deepening interdependence 
potentially enhances security at the domestic level by contributing to popular welfare, but 
increases vulnerability at the international level through creating dependency on export 
markets.21 Economic interdependence is predicated upon highly compatible economic 
security interests, and thus most likely to develop in the absence of strong conflicting 
national security concerns. 
Asia-Pacific economic interdependence faces an unprecedented challenge. The very 
success of regional interdependence may prove its undoing. Interdependence is 
threatened by heightened economic security concerns, not least those stemming from 
China’s impressive economic development. China’s seemingly-inexorable industrial 
progress and the eroding economic synergies and heightened export competition that 
result threaten a number of states’ efforts to attain important national and comprehensive 
economic security objectives.  
The impact of China’s economic rise is exacerbated by the effect of deepening integration 
into transnational economic processes. This generally increases vulnerability through 
17  Kathleen A. Walsh, ‘China R&D: A High-Tech Field of Dreams,’ in Yifei Sun, Maximilian von 
Zedtwitz and Denis Fred Simon, eds. Global R&D in China (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.11-
14.
18  See Peter Dicken and Henry Wai-chung Yeung, ‘Investing in the Future: East and Southeast 
Asian Firms in the Global Economy,’ in Kris Olds et al, eds. Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific: 
Contested Territories (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.122-23.
19  See, for example Peter Katzenstein, ‘Regionalism in Comparative Perspective.’ Cooperation 
and Conflict Vol.31, No.2 (1996), p.128.
20  Kevin G. Cai, The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Explaining Regional Economic Integration 
in Asia (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.17.
21  Stuart Harris, ‘The Economic Aspects of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region.’ Journal of 
Strategic Studies Vol.18, No.3 (1995), p.38.
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restricting the capacity of political authorities to unilaterally address issues of concern. Not 
only is it the case that it is much more difficult to do so without impacting negatively on the 
local economy, but the scope for this often is limited by bi- and multilateral commitments 
entered into in the interest of supporting economic progress. This effect is particularly 
marked in this region, where economic processes increasingly are tied to China. As a 
result, while concern over the security implications of China’s economic progress may 
encourage political intervention in economic processes, this may prove impractical or 
impossible. 
China’s economic development and the more demanding requirements of economic 
collaboration that result have important implications for trilateralism. Economic security 
considerations played a largely positive role in the past. The comprehensive economic 
security interests of most Asia-Pacific states were highly compatible, and there was 
common interest in deepening economic collaboration. The economic importance of 
China to the United States and other states, including the regional friends and allies of the 
United States, is growing. This is accompanied by increasing vulnerability, the dangers 
of which have been demonstrated by China on more than one occasion. As a Chinese 
official said of Taiwan, ‘Our economy is our best weapon. We won’t attack them. We 
will buy them. It’s very Chinese.’22 For Australia, the potential for Chinese authorities to 
intervene in ways harmful to its interests was demonstrated by the arrest and conviction 
of a number of staff of the firm Rio Tinto in 2010, though the extent to which this case 
represented any deliberate Chinese policy remains unclear. Despite China’s potential, 
however, comprehensive economic security concerns continue to encourage continued 
economic engagement of China on the part of political authorities in Australia, the United 
States, and elsewhere in the region. 
China’s politico-military rise has been less dramatic than its economic rise, but is 
generating even greater concern, particularly in the United States, and is contributing to 
the transformation of the regional security landscape. China’s position in the Asia-Pacific 
now is more prominent than at any point in its modern history. As well as increasing its 
bilateral and multilateral political engagement of Asia-Pacific states, China is adopting a 
more conspicuous military posture in the region, particularly where contested claims in 
the South China Sea are concerned. Perhaps more significantly, Chinese engagement of 
states through the forum of regional security mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) is growing.
This trend has been accompanied by the development of China’s military capabilities 
in relative as well as absolute terms, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) evolves 
from an establishment capable of territorial defence into one able to support a broad 
range of political objectives in and to a limited extent beyond the regional environment. 
The transformation of the PLA is manifest in its introduction of increasingly advanced 
generations of armaments based on progressively greater indigenous technological 
inputs. This demonstrates China’s defence-industrial progress, which has been pursued 
in conjunction with general industrial development.23 The economic progress resulting 
from China’s efforts to promote comprehensive economic security is providing a strong 
basis for arms-related production and R&D, as well as the means of affording defence 
modernization. Economic interdependence thus has provided a basis for what is regarded 
in some quarters as threatening military development on the part of China. While the 
pursuit of defence modernization is not necessarily indicative of the intent or even the 
willingness of the political authorities responsible to employ military instruments in 
support of policy objectives, defence development in China often is read this way. High-
profile arms programs such as the recent deployment of its first aircraft carrier reinforce 
concerns in the United States and elsewhere stemming from suspicion of the long-term 
22  N. Tucker, ‘If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?’ The Washington 
Quarterly Vol.25, No.3 (2002), p.16.
23  See Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp.176-234.
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objectives of China’s leaders.  China’s politico-military rise has important economic 
security implications for the Asia-Pacific region, with considerable potential to generate 
heightened attention to the requirements of national economic security. As noted above, 
the policy requirements associated with national economic security conflict with those of 
comprehensive economic security in important respects, and often prove incompatible. 
The increased politicization of regional economic relations through a stronger emphasis 
on developing national economic assets, such as ensuring the capacity of local industry to 
fulfil defence requirements, and on limiting the potential of industrial processes to support 
defence-industrial development elsewhere, threatens both economic regionalism and 
regionalization. 
Economic Security Responses to the Rise of china
The rise of China impacts on economic security in the United States and Australia in 
dissimilar ways, reflecting the distinct perspectives and requirements of their policy 
communities. In the case of Australia, a rising China holds considerable promise as an 
export market. At the same time, however, China potentially provides a serious challenge. 
The importance attached to the economic relationship with China is such that the potential 
scope for Chinese authorities to exert leverage through the relationship is considerable, 
should they seek to exploit this potential. Even without this, Australia is very sensitive to 
changes in the regional economic landscape, whether they stem from China directly or 
indirectly through the response of the United States to the rise of China.  
The common ground with China is eroding most where the United States is concerned. 
While the only direct economic threat faced by the United States is that stemming from 
increased competition for minerals and hydrocarbon resources, and it is less sensitive 
to changes in the regional economic landscape, China’s rise exacerbates the dilemmas 
of U.S. security policy while the more complex regional context of economic security 
complicates efforts to engage regional economic and political partners in the pursuit of 
important policy objectives. 
Political authorities in the United States are particularly sensitive to the rise of China as 
a result of their penchant for considering economic trends and developments in terms 
of security, but regardless of this are encouraged to consider the security implications of 
this by the breadth of their security concerns. The rise of China is occurring in the context 
of the general securitization of U.S. foreign economic policy. While this trend has been 
underway for some time, it is growing more pronounced.24
The salience of national economic security in the United States renders the trends 
involved in the rise of China troubling to political authorities. The dominant official 
perspective at this time is reflected in the defence strategic review released in January 
2012, which states that ‘Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will 
have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways.’25 
Significantly, this document highlights the lack of ‘clarity of . . . strategic intentions’ 
underlying China’s military rise as a source of concern.26 Concerns such as these have 
driven recent initiatives to strengthen the regional military position of the United States. 
This perspective mirrors general concern in the United States over the perceived national 
economic security threat posed by China. John Mearsheimer, for example, argues that 
China’s economic growth contributes to its potential for hegemony, and that the United 
States had ‘a profound interest’ in slowing this.27
24  Richard Higgott, ‘After Neoliberal Globalization: The “Securitization” of U.S. Foreign Economic 
Policy in East Asia.’ Critical Asian Studies Vol.36, No.3 (2004), p.426.
25  United States, Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense (Washington: Department of Defense, 2012), p.2.
26  Ibid.
27  John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Future of the American Pacifier.’ Foreign Affairs Vol.80, No.5 (2001), 
pp.56-57.
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U.S. authorities face a challenge that is distinct from that confronting their counterparts 
in the region. The importance attached to both national and comprehensive economic 
security in the United States forces authorities to consider conflicting objectives and to 
reconcile them as best they can. U.S. differences with China are only partially offset by 
the continuing incentives for economic collaboration. The dilemmas facing U.S. authorities 
will grow more acute should national security concern over China’s rise strengthen further. 
This U.S. policy concern cannot but impact significantly on the Sino-American 
relationship. This includes in economic as well as politico-military terms. The common 
ground manifest in U.S. support for the admission of China to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is eroding, though it remains substantial. Industrial relations 
constitute one noteworthy facet of the Sino-American economic relationship. Inter-firm 
ties have expanded and grown in importance as economic relations between China and 
the United States have deepened. U.S. authorities are currently addressing their national 
economic security concerns in this area by limiting collaboration in key industrial sectors. 
Restricting the capacity of U.S. firms to overcome their resource limitations in this manner 
potentially impacts negatively in comprehensive economic security terms, but is being 
pursued nonetheless. 
The U.S. quest for economic security has a potential impact that extends well beyond the 
United States. This involves its regional structural implications. The impact of its concern 
over China’s economic and political rise is less readily apparent at this level, but has more 
far-reaching consequences for the United States and for trilateralism. This stems not so 
much from the role of the United States in regional economic institution-building as from 
its potential impact on how Asia-Pacific states approach economic interdependence. 
These prospects are explored below.  
The United States and the Asia-Pacific Economic Landscape
The scope for concern over China’s rise to reshape the U.S. approach to economic issues 
in the Asia-Pacific, and thus the regional economic landscape, is considerable. While 
the United States has not driven the development of regional institutions (economic or 
otherwise), it has supported many of the economic initiatives launched by other states 
and has played a crucial role in introducing and promoting key norms that underlie 
prominent regional mechanisms. This has played a key role in the development of a 
dense network of interconnected bilateral and multilateral economic arrangements. The 
position of the United States as a ‘benign hegemon’ contributed to this.28 At the same 
time, however, U.S. authorities have sought to undermine regional multilateral initiatives 
which they regarded as detrimental to their interests. This can be seen in the U.S. 
approach to the original East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) initiative.29 
Given the importance of the Asia-Pacific to the United States in economic and political 
terms, there is little prospect that it will disengage from the region. This includes in terms 
of regional multilateral political and economic processes that are considered important to 
the interests of the United States. Recognition of the growing importance of the region to 
the United States has been evident under the administration of President Barack Obama, 
and has driven increased bilateral and multilateral engagement of Asia-Pacific states in 
economic and other terms. The attendance of both President Obama and Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton at the East Asia Summit in November 2011 strongly signalled U.S. 
intentions in this regard. Concern over the rise of China stands to reinforce this trend 
as U.S. authorities more carefully consider the terms of economic and politico-military 
engagement. 
28  See Jürgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and 
Prospects (London: Rou (tledge, 2003), p.71.
29  Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009), pp.154-55.
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U.S. authorities can be expected to exert more vigorous efforts to shape the regional 
economic landscape, particularly in terms of processes that that are perceived as 
threatening the autonomy and competitiveness of U.S. industry or which contribute 
to Chinese industrial capabilities. Increased efforts to address aspects of economic 
interdependence which impact negatively on national security are likely to include greater 
attention to the issue of industrial surveillance, to enhance the government’s capacity 
to deal with activities of concern, as well as strengthened industrial governance at the 
domestic and international levels, including through increased regulation. 
The narrowing of the perceived scope for economic interdependence with China will 
necessarily affect U.S. relations with other Asia-Pacific states given the depth of regional 
economic integration. We can anticipate more complex bilateralism as U.S. authorities 
increase their efforts to set terms of economic relations that support their national 
and comprehensive economic security objectives. This potentially involves building 
on the security-related exemptions that typically are built into bilateral preferential 
trade agreements or direct intervention in cases of industrial collaboration where this 
is considered threatening to U.S. security interests, such as third-party collaboration 
by foreign firms working with U.S. firms. As recent experience in dealing with western 
European governments demonstrates, this can be a difficult exercise even in an 
environment of close political relations.
The potential scope for the United States to more effectively address its national 
economic security concerns in the manner outlined above is circumscribed by its 
comprehensive economic security requirements. The ongoing requirement to address 
comprehensive economic security concerns will temper the inclination to intervene in 
economic processes. While U.S. authorities may wish to protect the integrity of key firms 
or particular high-technology industrial sectors and to limit their potential contribution to 
industrial progress in China, they also must ensure their survival without increased direct 
state support, the scope for which is limited by a number of domestic and international 
factors, including U.S. participation in the WTO. Nonetheless, there remains considerable 
potential to complicate economic and political relations with Asia-Pacific states, including 
its regional friends and allies, as U.S. authorities seek to manage industrial relations 
without jeopardizing the basis for economic success.  
More serious is the potential structural impact of the U.S. response to the rise of China. 
In seeking to set terms of economic relations that meet its national security requirements, 
the United States runs the risk of threatening the basis for collaboration that is crucial 
to economic interdependence. Heightened U.S. economic nationalism has the potential 
to discourage support for multilateral initiatives in the region, as was the case with fear 
over U.S. domination of APEC following the Asian Financial Crisis.30 This has major 
implications for the environment for trilateralism, as asymmetric as trilateralism is in 
practice. This also may encourage a similar policy shift on the part of other Asia-Pacific 
states mirroring state responses to the Great Depression. The greater the attention 
to national economic security, the more doubtful the long-term prospects for regional 
economic collaboration.
Alternatively, this may encourage forms of economic regionalism that exclude the United 
States. While this is a difficult exercise given the economic importance of the United 
States to states in the region, it is a logical response, particularly on the part of political 
authorities in China and elsewhere in the region where there is interest in limiting the role 
of the United States. It is important to note that interest in excluding the United States 
from important regional processes has been apparent on the part of particular actors in 
the region for some time. Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal of 1990, which featured such an approach, illustrates 
the potential for this.31 The capacity of China to offset the role of the United States in the 
regional economic landscape – which is growing – may prove crucial to this. 
30  Higgott, p.434.
31  Acharya, p.154.
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It is important to consider China’s structural role in the regional economic landscape and 
how this may evolve as it rises. Any decline in American support for economic regionalism 
as this has developed in the Asia-Pacific enhances the potential of China stemming from 
its growing economic importance and its evident interest in assuming a more prominent 
role in the regional, not to mention global, economy. China has considerable potential 
to supplement or even supplant the United States in providing norms conducive to 
economic interdependence and thus to the environment for trilateralism. Recent trends in 
Chinese multilateralism, which have seen China engage an expanding list of economic 
mechanisms, suggest that its leaders are comfortable with the values underpinning 
multilateralism. China has been complicit for some time in maintaining regional stability in 
the Asia-Pacific region, such as in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, 
and has contributed to deepening economic regionalism, particularly in Southeast Asia. 
Its foreign economic policy has seen it enter into free-trade agreements with many of its 
neighbours, and Chinese authorities have sought to discourage the use of sanctions.32 
Long-term Chinese support for multilateralism cannot be assumed, however. The 
depth of China’s commitment to the norms embodied in regional multilateral processes 
remains uncertain, not least because China’s approach to multilateralism is still nascent 
and remains the subject of considerable debate within China.33 Given the guarded 
U.S. approach to multilateralism in the region, which Ralph Cossa characterizes as 
‘multilateralism with caveats’,34 this would not necessarily substantially affect regional 
economic relations. There is substantial common ground between the United States and 
China in terms of many of the features of multilateral processes at the present time, even 
if political authorities in these states do not necessarily regard the inclusion of the other 
state in particular arrangements an important policy priority. 
Whither trilateralism?
The pressures on the regional economic landscape produced by China’s rise and the U.S. 
policy response have major implications for trilateralism, but not in terms of any direct 
Sino-Australian-American economic relationship. Where economic issues are concerned, 
there are distinct Sino-American, U.S.-Australian, and Sino-Australian relationships. 
The same is true of security relationships. The concept of trilateralism is important in 
considering the broader relationship between these states; trilateralism does not so 
much a triangular relationship as the environment for relations between Australia, China, 
and the United States. The implications for trilateralism stem from the potential for the 
narrowing scope for economic interdependence. While interdependence does not require 
multilateralism, multilateralism has played a crucial role in structuring the international 
environment in a manner conducive to transnational commercial relations. 
The potential impact of the weakened basis for interdependence differs across the region, 
based on states’ economic strengths and the nature of their economic relations with each 
other. The general long-term prospects are cause for concern where Australia, China, and 
the United States are concerned. 
The nature of Australia’s economic and political relationships with China and the 
United States means that it is largely unaffected by the tensions accompanying China’s 
economic and political rise. Political authorities are not confronted by the need to choose 
between an economic relationship with China which is based around the supply of natural 
resources and a political relationship with the United States which is based on common 
security interests in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. At the same time, however, 
32  Russell Ong, China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2007), p.19.
33  See Zhang Yongjin, ‘Understanding Chinese Views of the Emerging Global Order,’ in Wang 
Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian, eds. China and the New International Order (London: Routledge, 
2008), pp.149-67.
34  Ralph A. Cossa, ‘Evolving U.S. Views on Asia’s Future Institutional Architecture,’ in Michael 
J. Green and Bates Gill, eds. Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the 
Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p.39
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Australia potentially will suffer from a more fragmented regional economic environment 
which is less favourable to foreign investment and where there is reduced demand 
for natural resources, the extraction and export of which constitute a key pillar of the 
Australian economy. This constitutes a serious threat to Australian economic security over 
the long term. 
More significant for the long-term prospects for trilateralism is the potential impact of the 
politicization of regional economic relations. Australia’s economic and security policy 
divide is threatened by deepening U.S. security concern over China. The demonstrated 
willingness of U.S. authorities to employ economic sanctions in support of important policy 
objectives often extends to securing the adherence of other states. This has important 
implications for Australia. China’s reliance on Australia for many of the resources 
necessary for its economic development renders Australia a logical partner to include in 
economic sanctions directed at China. This potentially would force Australian authorities 
to choose between a strong security relationship with the United States and a strong 
economic relationship with China.   
The long-term prospects for the United States stemming from the rise of China and the 
national security requirements that result involve a deepening of the trends outlined 
above. One of the difficulties involved in considering the potential impact of this over the 
long term is the lack of precedents. The degree of economic interdependence found in 
the Asia-Pacific region at the present time is matched only by that of North America and 
Western Europe, and in neither of these cases is this threatened in a manner similar to 
this region. Growing tension over China’s rise potentially is very disruptive in economic 
terms, but the scope for comprehensive economic security interests to induce caution on 
the part of political authorities, thus mitigating the effects of concern over national security, 
remains unexplored.  
It is instructive to consider past examples of how political and economic trends and 
developments have interacted in the region in the past. The perceived success of 
economic collaboration in fostering economic security contributed to declining concern 
over economic vulnerability and played a crucial role in encouraging state support 
for deepening economic interdependence in the region, while growing concern over 
the security implications of globalization engendered by the Asian Financial Crisis 
encouraged political authorities to reconsider their support for interdependence.35 While 
this offers little in the way of precedent, it does suggest the potential impact of the forces 
generated by China’s rise.
The issues raised by China’s economic and politico-military rise and how this is perceived 
in the United States are very instructive in terms of our understanding of trilateralism in 
the Asia-Pacific and how it operates. The region long has been notable for the apparent 
extent to which economic and security issues constituted distinct realms. The relative 
disaggregation of economic and politico-military issues in the region made it possible for 
political authorities to simultaneously pursue their national and comprehensive economic 
security with relatively little adverse impact on either. The correlation between security 
ties and economic ties was relatively weak as a result. No case illustrates this better than 
that of Australia. The result was a regional economic landscape that has been highly 
conducive to economic development and the pursuit of comprehensive economic security, 
as demonstrated by emerging industrial states such as South Korea and Singapore. It 
is noteworthy that China was readily accommodated into regional economic networks 
following its embarking on its program of economic reform and ‘opening,’ despite its 
substantial political differences with many of its neighbours. 
Economic trilateralism in the Asia-Pacific demonstrates the importance of considering 
the impact of security issues at a structural level, as well as in more direct terms. The 
environment for relations between and involving different states, including those of 
an economic nature, plays a crucial role and is subject to a wide range of influences. 
 35 Kahler, pp.24-27.
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This makes it necessary to look beyond any direct trilateral relationship in examining 
trilateralism. In the case of the three states that are the subject of this study, there is 
no simple trilateral economic relationship, despite considerable common ground in 
the importance of economic progress and the development of extensive transnational 
commercial relations. Instead, there are distinct bilateral economic relationships, which 
intersect through the regional structural environment.
concluding Remarks
Efforts by U.S. authorities to promote economic security of the United States in an Asia-
Pacific regional environment shaped by China’s economic and political rise highlight the 
indivisibility of political and economic issues in the region. Economic issues are but one 
important aspect of the complex security relationship that Asia-Pacific states share. 
Ultimately, the prospects for trilateralism will be determined by a complex range of factors. 
These include the features of China’s economic and political rise, the form of the policy 
response of the United States, and the impact of the resulting trends and developments. 
The dynamics of economic security in the Asia-Pacific are complex, and the regional 
environment of interdependence is threatened to the extent that political authorities in 
the United States and elsewhere increase their focus on the economic requirements of 
national security. 
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